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Galen Strawson argues that moral responsibility is impossible.1 In a recent paper, Robert 
Hartman helpfully restates Strawson’s argument as follows.2  
 
(P1) Reasons Premise. An agent S’s intentionally performing an action A for which she 
might be morally responsible is explained by certain features of her mental constitution 
MC – namely, certain reasons for action. 
(P2) Responsibility Premise.  
(1) S is morally responsible for an intentional action A only if S is morally 
responsible for the parts of her MC that explain her performing A. 
(2) S is morally responsible for her MC (or some parts of it) only if S is morally 
responsible for an earlier action A1 in which S intentionally and successfully 
brought about those parts of her MC. 
(P3) Iteration Premise. S is morally responsible for A by way of MC and A1 as previously 
described only if S has performed an infinite number of even earlier free actions. (See 
below.) 
(P4) Impossibility Premise. It is impossible for finite beings like us to have performed an 
infinite number of past actions.  
(C1) Conclusion. Hence, it is impossible for finite beings like us to be morally responsible 
for anything. 
 
 In this paper, we argue that the impossibility argument succeeds regardless of whether 
Strawson’s argument succeed. We argue for this on the basis of there being no basic 
responsibility-maker. That is, there is nothing that by itself makes someone morally responsible. 
We then argue that the focus on such a maker does explanatory work. Specifically, it explains 
why other skeptical arguments succeed.  
 
Part One: The Argument for Impossibility 
This paper argues that critics of Strawson’s argument, for instance, Randolphe Clarke, 
John Martin Fischer, Robert Hartman, Michael Istvan, and Boris Kment, fail to defeat the 
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argument for impossibility even if they were to defeat Strawson’s argument.3 Here’s why. 
Responsibility requires a basic responsibility-maker, that is, a minimal state or event that by 
itself makes someone morally responsible.4 This is similar to a basic intrinsic-value maker, 
which is the minimal feature that makes something morally valuable (consider, for example, a 
state of affairs that obtains). This responsibility-maker is either a capacity (that is, a particular 
type of state) or a choice (that is, a particular type of event). These are the most plausible 
candidates for the responsibility-maker. Yet both are implausible. For the purposes of this paper, 
an event involves a thing changing and a state involves it not changing.   
 Consider a capacity. In particular, consider a person’s complete psychology at a time. 
Intuitively, by itself, this is not enough to make a person morally responsible. This can be seen in 
that it intuitively seems that a newly created individual (for example, Frankenstein’s monster or 
Suzie Instant) is not blameworthy or praiseworthy for an act made immediately after creation.5 If 
responsibility just is being praiseworthy or blameworthy to some level (perhaps zero-level), and 
we think this is so, then it intuitively seems that instantly created people are not morally 
responsible for what they do immediately after creation because they are not responsible for  
their psychology. This is true no matter what capacities are included in the psychology they are 
given.  
The notion that a capacity is not a responsibility-maker can also be seen in that, despite 
attempts in the literature to show otherwise, it intuitively seems clear that a newly created person 
is no more responsible for an act immediately following creation than is a manipulated person 
for an act immediately after manipulation because neither has authorized, chosen, validated, or 
willed her psychology from which the act flows.6 Our view, then, is that a person cannot be 
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responsible for a capacity that was unchosen or for one that was chosen when the person is not 
responsible for the choice. 
 A second way to see that a capacity, rather than the exercise of it, is not a responsibility-
maker is in the notion that, in general, the right and the good focus on the exercise of capacities. 
On various theories, basic intrinsic-value makers (for short, ‘value-makers’) include knowledge, 
love, pleasure, and virtue. They do not include the capacity for these things. It would thus be 
surprising if the relevant capacity (for example, the capacity to respond to reasons or a capacity 
for normative competence) were a value-maker. Nor does the right focus on mere capacity. 
Decisions or actions are thought to be right or wrong. That is, they are the bearers of rightness. 
Again, these are exercises of capacities rather than capacities. If virtue is distinct from the right 
and the good, and we doubt it, it also rests on the exercise of capacities rather than a mere 
capacity. Virtue depends on whether someone has the right attitudes rather than the capacity to 
have such attitudes. An objector might argue that to be virtuous just is to have certain capacities, 
namely, to act or respond appropriately in various circumstances (and they might call these 
capacities ‘character traits’, and name them ‘bravery’, ‘honesty’, and so forth, according to the 
context). But this objection would fail, as it confuses what makes one able to be virtuous with 
virtue. Similarly, truing to make a capacity the responsibility-maker would be to confuse what 
makes a person capable of acting responsibly with responsibility. Hence, it would be odd if 
moral responsibility, a property of the moral realm, has a strikingly different basis than do the 
other members of the realm: the right, the good, and virtue.   
 A third way to see that a capacity, rather than the exercise of it, is not a responsibility-
maker can be seen if we consider negligence. A person is negligent when he is blameworthy 
because he does not know something but ought to know it. Negligence is more like a 
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responsibility-related capacity than exercise of the capacity because it need not involve the 
person thinking something, making a decision, executing an intention, and so on. While it is 
controversial, it seems to us that negligence is not a responsibility-maker.7 The idea, now 
common in the literature, is that negligence is indirectly related to an individual shaping her own 
life. In addition, what makes someone negligent of a relevant fact rather than merely ignorant of 
it involves conditions that beg the question on blameworthiness (for example, fair opportunity to 
know the relevant fact) or are irrelevant to responsibility (for example, incentives for due 
diligence). If people are not basically responsible for negligence, then they likely are not 
basically responsible on the basis of a capacity alone.  
 Consider, next, a decision (or choice).8 A person cannot be responsible for a decision that 
didn’t flow from her psychology or that flowed from her psychology when she is not responsible 
for her psychology. The first can be clearly seen in that a random decision (that is, one 
unconnected to one’s psychology or connected to it in an arbitrary way) is an implausible 
responsibility-maker. For example, if Alice’s brain randomly generates a decision to kill Smith, 
the decision by itself is an implausible responsibility-maker. The same is true if Alice is not 
responsible for her psychology (it results from manipulation) and immediately after manipulation 
she decides on the basis of her psychology to kill Smith. Intuitively, it might be thought that with 
enough time or thought Alice becomes responsible for her psychology. However, this is because 
with enough time or thought she authorizes, chooses, validates, or wills to retain her psychology 
and, thus, makes it hers. Our view, then, is that a person cannot be responsible for a decision that 
didn’t flow from her psychology nor for one that did flow from it when the person is not 
responsible for her psychology. 
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 A second way to see that a decision is not a responsibility-maker is that, contra Strawson, 
it would not be present even in infinite or self-created beings. An infinite being would still have 
to have a basic responsibility-maker, capacity or decision, and because neither is plausible, 
infinite instances of a choice flowing from a psychology and a psychology resulting from a 
choice would not add responsibility to a system any more than a finite system would add it in. 
By analogy, a sequence of things cannot be exclusively extrinsically valuable without something 
in the sequence being intrinsically valuable because nothing would add value into the system.  
The same is true for a self-created being. Consider, for example, if a being (for example, 
Chuck Norris) were so great that he didn’t have a father. Instead, he traveled back in time and 
impregnated his mother.9 Self-creation would not make him morally responsible. This would 
even be true if it were possible for him to reach out from a possible but non-existent state to 
create his psychology from nothing. 
 It should be noted that the responsibility-maker cannot be a capacity-decision or decision-
capacity sequence because, again, nothing would add responsibility into the system. Also, the 
prior member of this sequence would do all the work. Again, this is analogous to a sequence of 
things that have purely extrinsic value.  
It should further be noted that our argument is independent of whether compatibilism or 
determinism is true. It is also independent of the particular capacity- or exercise-based theory of 
responsibility. That is, it is independent of whether responsibility rests on reason-responsiveness, 
aligned different-order desires, identification with desires, normative competence, agent-
causation ability, or some other capacity. It is also independent of decisions or acts. Consider 
self-forming acts, agent-caused acts, or some other exercise of a relevant capacity. In addition, 
our theory need not address whether moral luck occurs at the level of results, circumstances, or 
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constitutive conditions and, in fact, whether moral luck occurs at all. As noted above, it is also 
independent of whether a person is infinite or self-created. 
Nor is the basic responsibility-maker a pairing of a psychology and a decision. In 
particular, one in which a psychology in part or whole brings about a decision. It is hard to see 
how a person can be responsible for a psychology-decision pair unless he is either basically 
responsible for either the psychology or the decision. That is, it is hard to see how pairing two 
things for which a person is not basically responsible for would make him morally responsible. 
The same reasoning applies to decision-psychology pairing in which the decision in part or in 
whole brings about the psychology. The same is true for some number of cycles in which a 
person’s psychology affects her decision, which in turn affects her act, which in turn affects her 
psychology, and so on. Repeated cycles do not seem capable of grounding moral responsibility. 
Many sequences of events (specifically, psychology-decision-act sequences) do not seem to be 
capable of being a basic responsibility-maker if no one sequence is such a maker. By analogy, 
sequences of extrinsically valuable things depend on one thing being initially extrinsically 
valuable. This in turn must rest on something being intrinsically valuable. It cannot be tortoises 
all the way down.   
We also think that not merely is there no basic responsibility-maker, but no such maker is 
possible. If the two most plausible candidates (decision and psychology) do not ground moral 
responsibility, then it is hard to see how there can be one in any possible world. Hence, even a 
being who makes an infinite number of decisions, performs a self-forming act (if such an act 
were possible), or who does wrong or bad acts in a way that is neither akratic nor negligent 
would not be morally responsible. In short, moral responsibility is impossible. 
 Here, then, is the dilemma that opponents of impossibility face.  
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(1) If someone is morally responsible, then there is a basic responsibility-maker. 
(2) If there is a basic responsibility-maker, then it is a psychology (at a time) or a decision. 
(3) The basic responsibility-maker is not a psychology.    
(4) The basic responsibility-maker is not a decision. 
(5) Hence, no one is morally responsible. 
 
Part Two: The Impossibility Argument Explains Other Skeptical Arguments 
Another way to see the force of our argument is that the lack of a responsibility-
foundation explains other plausible arguments against moral responsibility. One argument put 
forth by Galen Strawson and Robert Kane is that if someone is morally responsible, then he 
made an infinite number of decisions or a self-forming decision.10 But, Strawson and Kane 
contend, no one can make an infinite number of decisions. This is because a person only exists in 
time, and if a person had a first moment in time, then he would exist for, and only for, 
increasingly large finite periods of time. This is similar to the way in which if someone were to 
start counting numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, …, he would never reach infinity because there would always 
be one more counting number. Hence, however old one might be (excluding infinity, which we 
address in the next paragraph), it would still be true that they did not make an infinite number of 
decisions.  
Even if a person could make an infinite number of decisions, he would still need a 
responsibility-foundation to make him morally responsible. Consider again the analogy of an 
infinite number of extrinsically valuable goods. This is impossible if there is no intrinsically 
valuable good that can add value into the system. There is no such foundation. Similarly, there 
cannot be an infinite number of inferentially justified beliefs if there is no basic justified belief. 
There might be a justification-foundation or –circle, but not an infinite sequence because nothing 
would add justification into the system. In our view, this would also prevent there from being a 
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justification-circle (pure coherentism), but our argument need not rest on this claim because there 
is no plausible responsibility-making circle.11 
But Kane and Strawson depart at this point, the former arguing that self-forming actions 
are the out for the defender of responsibility.12 However, one cannot make an initial self-forming 
decision in which the decider is responsible for the decision or what immediately follows from 
it. The reason is that such a decision would have to be similar to an epistemically foundational 
belief. An epistemically foundational belief is self-justified, or justified but not on the basis of 
another justifier. Even if a self-justified belief can occur, there cannot be a parallel basic 
responsibility-maker. That is, there is no responsibility-maker that makes itself responsible or is 
made responsible by something that is not a responsibility-maker (for example, a psychology or 
decision).  
The above argument shows that the most plausible candidates for a basic responsibility-
maker fail. Intuitively, it is hard to see if a psychology or decision is not itself a basic 
responsibility-maker, how it can make a person responsible for another thing (specifically, a 
subsequent psychology or decision). This explains why responsibility does not depend on an 
infinite sequence of decisions or a self-forming decision (or act). 
Consider next Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against compatibilism.13 What 
makes the argument work is that a person is not morally responsible for manipulated thoughts 
and yet if the manipulation were to go from one determinist form (neural manipulation) to 
another determinist form (conditioning), it makes no difference to whether the manipulated 
individual is responsible. Similarly, switching from one determinist type of conditioning to 
another (intentional versus unintentional conditioning) makes no difference to responsibility if 
the two types of conditioning act on an individual in the same way. The reason there is no 
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difference is that the types of determinist manipulation and conditioning do not differ in whether 
they undermine or override the basic responsibility-maker. There is no such maker.   
 Consider next the akrasia-negligence pincer seen in part or whole in the work of Neil 
Levy, Gideon Rosen, and Michael Zimmerman.14 This argument runs as follows: If someone is 
morally responsible with a negative valence, then he is blameworthy. If someone is 
blameworthy, then he is blameworthy on the basis of akrasia or negligence. That is, either he 
knows what he is doing is wrong, bad, or imprudent and, thus, judges that all things considered 
he ought not do it or he does not have such knowledge and makes no such judgment.   
If he knows what he is doing and, thus, judges that all things considered he ought not do 
it, then one of three things is true. He cannot make himself act in accord with his all-things-
considered judgment, he can make himself act in accord with this judgment but does not know 
how to do so, or he can make himself act in accord with this judgment but chooses not do so (or, 
perhaps, wills not to do so). The first prong of the trilemma (lack of control) cannot ground 
blameworthiness. The second prong is an instance of negligence not akrasia. The third prong 
makes it mysterious why a person would not choose to act in accord with his all-things-
considered judgment. Such a choice would involve theoretical or practical irrationality. Such 
irrationality cannot make someone blameworthy.  
Nor does basic blameworthiness rest on ignorance. A person is ignorant about something 
if he lacks a belief about it. It is intuitively hard to see how a person might be fundamentally 
blameworthy for lacking a belief. Intuitively, he might be responsible for lacking a belief 
because he did something blameworthy earlier (for example, he decided not to perform due 
diligence or not to make himself into a certain sort of person). Such derivative blameworthiness 
is not relevant here.  
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If a person knows what is wrong, bad, or imprudent, but does not judge it worthy of 
avoiding, the negligence-problem reappears. Either he knows that something wrong, bad, or 
imprudent is to be judged as something that all things considered should be avoided or he does 
not. If he does know and does not so judge it, we are back to asking whether he is unable to do 
so, able but does not know how to do so, or able and knows how do so but chooses not to do it. 
That is, we are back to the problem of understanding responsibility for akrasia.  
What explains why the akrasia-negligence pincer works is that neither akrasia nor 
negligence is a basic responsibility-maker. Nor is either one closely linked to such a maker. As a 
result, neither prong will get us to something that would constitute or justify basic responsibility 
with a negative valence.   
Consider last responsibility internalism. This is discussed in work such as that by Al 
Mele, Michael McKenna, Ishtiyaque Haji, and Stefan Cuypers.15 The concern here is that there is 
good reason to believe the responsibility-internalism is true. Responsibility-internalism asserts 
that a person is responsible for, and only for, intrinsic events (or states). This is because a person 
only directly controls internal events alone and only such events have a sufficiently close 
connection to their psychology. Consider, for example, one’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. 
Intuitively, a person is responsible for, and only for, that which he directly controls and which 
directly flows from his psychology. Anything else he seems to be responsible for is inherited 
from his responsibility for the things to which he is directly connected. If nothing is added in this 
inheritance, the responsibility is limited to the intrinsic events.   
If responsibility-internalism is true, then responsibility is limited to intrinsic events. 
Specifically, it is limited to a decision in a particular space and time or, perhaps, a psychology 
that is similarly limited. Let us focus on a decision. On this theory, a person is responsible for, 
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and only for, what goes on in his head at the time he decides something. If responsibility is so 
limited, then it is counterintuitive. A person would not be responsible for adultery, battery, 
murder, theft, etc. Rather, he is responsible for deciding to do these things or, perhaps, willing to 
do them. This suggests that our intuitive picture of responsibility has little connection to 
laypeople’s responsibility-judgments. The striking divergence suggests that our confidence in 
moral responsibility is misplaced. The responsibility-foundation argument explains why. That 
our intuitions systematically focus on things for which we are not responsible is less surprising 
when we realize there is nothing that they might focus on for which we are responsible.   
 In the context of libertarian views of moral responsibility, the lack of a responsibility-
foundation explains why even if the libertarian could provide a contrastive explanation for why a 
person does one act rather than another, this would still not provide a basic responsibility-maker. 
Similarly, the luck and disappearing-agent objections are beside the point because neither they 
nor the purported solutions to them get us closer to there being such a maker.     
 Here is a summary of the impossibility arguments and how the responsibility-foundation 
relates to other arguments.   
 
Skeptical Argument How the Responsibility-Foundation Relates 
to the Argument 
Infinite-decision argument 
1. If a person is responsible, then he made 
an infinite number of decisions.  
2. No one does so.   
The suggested need for an infinite number 
of decisions is an attempt, albeit an 
unsuccessful one, to provide a basic 
responsibility-maker.  
Self-forming-act argument 
1. If a person is morally responsible, then 
he performed a self-forming act.  
2. No one does so. 
This succeeds because a self-forming 
decision (or act) is not a basic 
responsibility-maker.  
Akrasia-Negligence Pincer 
1. If a person is blameworthy, then she is 
non-derivatively blameworthy for 
akrasia or negligence.  
This succeeds because neither akrasia nor 
negligence are basic blameworthiness-
makers. Nor do they inherit 
blameworthiness from another such maker. 
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2. No one is non-derivatively blameworthy 
for either one.   
Responsibility-Internalism 
1. The evidence that people are morally 
responsible largely rests on our intuitions 
that they are responsible for their acts 
and the consequences they bring about.  
2. If 1, then people are probably not 
morally responsible.   
Our intuitions are systematically mistaken 
because they direct us away from the most 
plausible candidates for a basic 
responsibility-maker. 
 
Part Three: Conclusion 
Contrary to Clarke, Fischer, Hartman, Istvan, Kment, and other people who have attacked 
the impossibility thesis, responsibility is impossible because there is no responsibility-maker and 
there needs to be one if people are morally responsible. The two most plausible candidates, 
psychology and decision, fail. A person is not responsible for an unchosen psychology or a 
psychology that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice. This can be seen 
in intuitions about instantly-created and manipulated people. This result is further supported by 
the notion that, in general, the right, the good, and virtue rest on the exercise of a capacity rather 
than the capacity itself. It is also supported by the notion that negligence is not a responsibility-
maker. 
 A person is not responsible for a choice that does not reflect his psychology or that does 
reflect it when he is not responsible for the psychology. This can be seen by considering 
intuitions regarding acts that are unconnected or arbitrarily connected to a person’s psychology. 
It can also be seen intuitions about acts that result from a manipulated psychology. The problem 
with choice as a foundation can be further seen in that an infinite or self-created person would 
not be responsible despite these superhuman choice-related features.  
 The lack of a responsibility-maker is independent of the debates over compatibilism, 
derivative responsibility, determinism, moral luck, the nature of free will, the principle of 
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alternative possibilities, and so on. The above argument rests on the notion that similar to how 
extrinsic value depends on intrinsic value, responsibility depends on a basic responsibility-
maker. Sadly, there’s no such maker.16 
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